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IS RENT CONTROL GOOD SOCIAL POLICY?
EDGAR 0. OLSEN*
Rent control has been a major type of governmental housing regula-
tion throughout the world for many years.' In the United States, it has
been the exception rather than the rule. It existed throughout the coun-
try during and immediately after the Second World War, but by the early
1950s it had been abandoned almost everywhere. During the remainder
of the 1950s and 1960s, it existed only in a few cities in the State of New
York, most notably New York City. There was a resurgence of rent con-
trol during the 1970s and early 1980s when rates of inflation were high.
Over 200 localities in the United States currently have some form of rent
regulation, and more than ten percent of all rental units are subject to
rent control. Controls now exist in six states (California, Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York) and the District
of Columbia. New York City accounts for thirty-nine percent of all rent
controlled units; Los Angeles, seventeen percent; San Francisco, seven
percent; and Washington, D.C., four percent. 2
Sound housing policy requires an understanding of the conse-
quences of any phenomenon which affects so much of the American
housing stock and so many individual housing markets. The purpose of
this paper is to consider whether rent control is good social policy based
in part on the best available evidence concerning its justifications and
effects.
It is important to recognize at the outset that different rent control
ordinances have different provisions and these differences can lead to dif-
* Professor of Economics, University of Virginia. Tulane University, B.A., 1963; Rice Uni-
versity, Ph.D., 1968. I want to thank Bob Ellickson for encouraging me to read some of the legal
literature on rent control and for providing me with excellent references. Although Epstein (1988,
1989) has done a superb job of conveying some of the main economic insights concerning the desira-
bility of rent control, Ellickson correctly perceived that someone with a more detailed knowledge of
the technical economic aspects of housing markets and the effects of rent control would be able to fill
a gap in the legal literature. Time constraints have limited the extent of my reading of the legal
decisions and writings on rent control. However, I suspect that the papers that I have read contain
the most common arguments and that this paper does bring what economists know to bear on these
arguments.
1. For a description of rent control ordinances outside of the United States, see STEPHEN
MALPEZZI & GWENDOLYN BALL, RENT CONTROL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (World Bank,
1991) DISCUSSION PAPER 129.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV., OFF. OF POLICY ANALYSIS & RES. REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON RENT CONTROL, GPO Document number 312-228/41023. Table 2 (1991) [hereinafter
HUD].
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ferent results.3 For example, almost all jurisdictions automatically in-
crease the ceiling rent each year, some by a fixed percentage and others
by a fraction of the increase in the Consumer Price Index. However,
these percentages and fractions differ greatly across localities. Los Ange-
les allows one hundred percent of the increase in the CPI; Berkeley only
sixty-two percent. Some jurisdictions with rent control allow rents to be
increased for new tenants without limit, others limit the increase, and
still others allow no increase. If landlords are allowed to set rents freely
when units turn over, it is to be expected that rent control will not lead to
any substantial transfer of wealth from owners of rental housing to their
tenants. Instead it will lead to higher initial rents and a slower rate of
increase in rents for sitting tenants. Thus the transfers will be from ten-
ants who move frequently to those who seldom move. The Los Angeles
ordinance has this feature, and the major studies of it support this conjec-
ture.4 The best estimate of the more recent study is that rent control has
lowered the mean rent in Los Angeles by seven dollars per month but
that it has increased the mean rent of those who have been living in their
apartment one or two years by twenty-eight dollars per month. 5
The available evidence suggests that the majority of ordinances in
the United States today have little effect on rents and hence do not, to
any great extent, have the ill effects often attributed to rent control.6
There is little to be said for such ordinances. An administrative cost is
incurred to produce a small amount of haphazard redistribution. Since
proponents of rent control usually argue that these ordinances should be
made more stringent in order to have the effects that they desire, this
paper will focus on the desirability of more restrictive laws.
Attempts to justify rent control in the legal literature leave much to
3. For a description of some of the ordinances in the United States, see Kenneth K. Baar,
Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 756-841
(1983); HUD, supra note 2, at 43-63.
4. C. PETER RYDELL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RENT CONTROL ON THE Los ANGELES
HOUSING MARKET (1981); Hamilton et al., The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization System: Impacts
and Alternatives (April, 1985) (prepared for the Rent Stabilization Division of the Community De-
velopment Department of the City of Los Angeles).
5. Hamilton et al., supra note 4, at Exhibits 2-12.
6. Richard P. Appelbaum & John I. Gilderbloom, The Redistributional Impact of Modern
Rent Control, 22 ENV'T & PLAN. A. 601 (1990). ANTHONY DOWNS, RESIDENTIAL RENT CON-
TROL: AN EVALUATION (1988). John I. Gilderbloom, Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the
Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock, 17 URB. AFF. Q. 123 (1981). John I. Gilderbloom, The
Impact of Moderate Rent Control in New Jersey: An Empirical Study of 26 Rent Controlled Cities, 7
URn. ANALYSIS 135 (1983); John I. Gilderbloom, The Impact of Rent Control on Rent in New Jersey
Communities, 71 Soc. & Soc. RES. 11 (1986); Hamilton et al., supra note 4; C. PETER RYDELL ET
AL., supra note 4. For a critical analysis of these and other studies of rent control, see Edgar 0.
Olsen, What is Known about the Effects of Rent Control? (September 1990) (prepared for the Office
of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development).
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be desired. Keating7 asserts that housing is a fundamental right, but he
does not tell us to what type of housing people have a right and why. He
also offers the usual popular arguments for housing subsidies to low-in-
come households, namely "the declining stock of affordable housing and
the increasing number of tenants, millions, mostly poor, living in sub-
standard housing and paying very high proportions of their income for
rent."8 Since existing studies suggest that housing subsidies to low-in-
come households and rent control have the exact opposite effect on con-
sumption patterns, it is difficult to understand how they can have the
same justifications. 9 Furthermore, it is not clear why all of the phenom-
ena mentioned are considered problems. If low-income households de-
cided to place a higher value on housing (that is, to spend a higher
proportion of their income on it), the housing stock would be upgraded
and the stock of affordable housing as usually measured would decline.
Keating does not explain why this would be bad. Dobkin says that
"[fr]ent controls are necessary to protect people who through no fault of
their own would otherwise be priced out of decent housing." °10 There are
several problems with this argument. First, rent control is not limited to
people who are priced out of decent housing. The majority of renters are
not poor, and the majority of low-income renters live in adequate hous-
ing. 1 Second, rent control is not necessary to attain this end since it
could also be achieved by providing households that are priced out of
decent housing with housing subsidies financed by broad-based taxes. Fi-
nally, we might ask why people should be protected from this outcome.
If what underlies the preceding arguments for rent control is simply
a concern about the well-being of certain people, this should be stated.
Since the appropriate policy response to this concern depends on whether
the concerned believe that the objects of their concern know what is good
for themselves, it is important to take a stand on this issue. If we believe
that others are the best judges of their own well-being, then unrestricted
7. Dennis W. Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1989).
8. Id. at 1224 (citing NATIONAL Hous. TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE (1988)).
9. Housing subsidies such as public housing and Section 8 typically induce participants to
occupy better housing than they would choose if given equally costly cash grants. See, e.g., Edgar 0.
Olsen & David M. Barton, The Benefits and Costs of Public Housing in New York City, 20 J. PuB.
ECON. 1983; William J. Reeder, The Benefits and Costs of the Section 8 Existing Program, 26 J. PuB.
ECON. 349 (1985). Occupants of controlled units typically live in worse housing than they would
choose if given equally costly cash grants. Edgar 0. Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control,
80 J. POL. ECON. 1081 (1972).
10. Stephen Dobkin, Confiscating reality. The Illusion of Controls in the Big Apple, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1988).
11. Kathryn P. Nelson & Jill Khadduri, To Whom Should Limited Housing Resources Be Di-
rected?, 3 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE, Table 1 (1992).
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cash grants should replace other types of transfers such as rent control. ' 2
Housing subsidies are appropriate if some altruists believe that the ob-
jects of their concern undervalue housing and none believe that they
overvalue it.13
In stark contrast with the many superficial attempts to justify rent
control is Radin's detailed analysis. 14 It is impossible to convey the rich-
ness of her arguments here. However, the essence of her justification for
rent control might be summarized as follows. People care about the
identities of their neighbors, and they feel a loss when a long-time neigh-
bor moves. In the jargon of economics, an externality is involved here.
According to her argument, rent control is justified because it reduces
mobility and hence ameliorates the externality.
One might question the importance of this explanation regarding the
existence of rent control ordinances. If this justification is important, the
residents of New York City must surely be the most neighborly in the
country since they adopted rent control long before other cities. More
fundamentally, Radin does not explain why rent control is superior to
obvious alternative policies. For example, why is it better than imposing
a tax on those who move each year and distributing the proceeds to those
who stay? This will reduce mobility without the ill effects of rent control.
The failure to consider alternative means to a desirable end, such as
helping the poor, is a persistent shortcoming of arguments for rent con-
trol in the scholarly literature. If everyone would prefer some other pro-
gram to rent control, then it can hardly be argued that rent control is
good social policy. To concede, as proponents of rent control usually do,
that rent control involves inefficiencies is to concede that it leads to an
inefficient allocation of resources.' 5 By definition, an allocation is ineffi-
cient if and only if there exists a feasible alternative allocation preferred
by everyone. This means that there exists an alternative program that
everyone would prefer to rent control. Specifically, we could have im-
posed a proportional tax on the value of rental property owned on the
date to which rents were initially rolled back under rent control. The tax
rate could have been set so that the tax paid by each landlord is slightly
less than the reduction in the market value of his rental property result-
12. Edgar 0. Olsen, The Simple Analytics of the Externality Argument for Redistribution, in 2
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES: AN ANNUAL SURVEY OF EONOMICS 156-59 (M.B. Ballabon ed.,
1981).
13. Id. at 159-70.
14. Margaret J. Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986).
15. In economic terminology, an allocation of resources does not simply refer to how much of
each input is used to produce each good and service. It refers to how much of each good and service
is consumed by each person and how much of each good or service is supplied by each person.
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ing from rent control. The proceeds of the tax on each building could
have been distributed among the tenants in proportion to their rents at
that time. The general principle here is that we never want to adopt a
program when we can easily think of an alternative program that is bet-
ter for everyone.
To justify a government program, it is not enough to explain why
selected effects are desirable, for example, why we should help some of
the people who benefit from it. To justify a government program, you
must be able to justify all of its effects. It is necessary to explain why
money should be taken from those who bear its costs and why it should
be given to those who directly benefit. It is necessary to justify the distri-
bution of the benefits and costs of the program, that is, who gets large
and who gets small benefits and who bears large and who bears small
burdens. Finally, it is necessary to justify the form of the taxes and subsi-
dies. This paper addresses each of theses issues.
1. WHY SHOULD BENEFITS TO TENANTS BE FINANCED BY AN
IMPLICIT TAX ON LANDLORDS?
The burden of rent control is borne primarily by those who own
rental housing at the time that it becomes widely known that a rent con-
trol law will be adopted or modified in a way unfavorable to landlords. 16
This will be reflected in a decline in the prices for which affected rental
units can be sold. The primary beneficiaries are tenants who occupy
units at the times when these changes occur. 17
Why should benefits to tenants be financed by an implicit tax on
landlords? It is clear that some people who do not expect to occupy con-
trolled housing support rent control because they believe that owners of
16. Landlords who buy rental property after rent control is adopted do not bear a burden
unless the ordinance is unexpectedly changed to their disadvantage.
17. It is less clear whether tenants who move into these units later benefit because they often
pay bribes and incur extra search costs to obtain possession of the unit. With one exception, at-
tempts to estimate the benefits of rent control to such tenants ignore both as well as tenant expendi-
tures on maintenance and improvements. See Richard Ault & Richard Saba, The Economic Effects
of Long-term Rent Control. The Case of New York City, 3 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 25 (1990);
Joseph Gyourko & Peter Linneman, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Rent Control: An Empirical
Study of New York City, 26 J. URB. ECON. 54 (1989); Peter Linneman, The Effects of Rent Control
on the Distribution of Income Among New York City Renters, 22 J. URB. ECON. 14 (1987); Olsen,
supra note 9; Edgar 0. Olsen & Kathy A. York, The Effect of Different Measures of Benefit on
Estimates of the Distributive Consequences of Government Programs, in ECONOMIC TRANSFERS IN
THE UNITED STATES (Marilyn Moon ed., 1984). In a study of Cairo, Egypt, Malpezzi estimates
that the average controlled rent is sixty-two percent below the average market rent of controlled
units. However, when side payments and tenant maintenance and improvements are added to the
controlled rent, the discount is only thirty percent. MALPEZZI & BALL, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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rental housing make excess profits and they view rent control as a way of
returning these excess profits to tenants.
The discussion of this issue often fails to distinguish between two
very different situations. Most commonly, the discussion concerns a situ-
ation in which a large unexpected increase in demand for housing in an
area results in higher rents and excess profits.' 8 This can happen even if
the housing market is perfectly competitive. If the housing market is
perfectly competitive, excess profits during some periods will be offset by
deficient profits in others. Over their entire lives, some buildings will
yield higher returns than others due to mistaken expectations on the part
of their owners. However, the typical project will earn a competitive rate
of return. Such fluctuations in returns provide no good argument for
rent control. On the contrary, we want more housing to be provided in
this area and the excess profit that can be earned in the short-run pro-
vides the incentive for suppliers to do it. If we prevent excess profits by
instituting rent control, will anyone have an incentive to provide more
housing in the area?
The situation is quite different if excess profits are due to a monopo-
lized housing market. If suppliers of rental housing successfully collude
to set prices and prevent entry, they will consistently earn excess profits.
If monopoly power is substantial enough, then the government with all
its imperfections might be able to improve the situation using rent
control.
The belief that landlords make excessive profits is not supported by
any systematic evidence and few economists share this view.' 9 The ma-
jority of economists believe that easy entry into the rental housing busi-
ness precludes a greater than competitive rate of return on the typical
investment.
Two empirical regularities well-known to housing economists argue
against certain extreme views concerning the monopoly power of land-
lords. First, it is well documented that if the rents of units of all types
18. In this situation, the goal of rent control is sometimes described as protecting tenants from
opportunistic exploitation by landlords. This characterization of the response to an unexpected in-
crease in demand is an obvious attempt to persuade people to support a particular government policy
by the use of loaded words rather than by a serious analysis of the situation. Would proponents of
rent control who use this argument agree that landlords are being opportunistically exploited by
tenants when rents fall in response to a precipitous decrease in demand resulting from the closing of
a military base in a small town?
19. Some advocates of rent control argue explicitly that housing markets are not competitive,
and some cite an empirical study by two sociologists in support of this proposition. Keating, supra
note 7, at 1228-29 (citing JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING
RENTAL HOUSING 57-67 (1988)). It remains to be seen whether this study can withstand the scru-
tiny of economists.
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were increased by the same percentage from prevailing levels, renters
would ultimately occupy less desirable units and would spend more on
housing.20 If landlords could collude to set rents, they would have
charged higher rents because this would have resulted in greater revenue
along with less expenditure on maintenance. Second, it is equally well
documented that sitting tenants pay lower rents than new tenants for
identical units.2I This argues against the widespread belief that landlords
have market power over sitting tenants due to the out-of-pocket and
psychic costs of moving.
Housing economists have made few attempts to calculate rates of
return on rental housing and to compare them with returns on other
types of investment, but they have provided indirect evidence in support
of their views by deriving and testing implications of models of competi-
tive housing markets. 22 Generally speaking, the empirical evidence sup-
ports the view that housing markets are competitive. One problem with
this type of evidence is that it is extremely difficult to convey to a non-
technical audience. Direct evidence would be more persuasive provided
that the underlying data could be collected in a way which casts little
doubt on its credibility.
A superficially appealing explanation of why benefits to tenants
should be financed by an implicit tax on landlords is that the average
income of landlords exceeds that of their tenants and therefore these
transfers have the same justifications as other redistributive programs
such as public housing, food stamps, medicaid, and AFDC.
The only available information on the distribution of income among
owners of controlled units comes from Arthur D. Little's survey of the
1984 incomes of owners of rent stabilized units in New York City. 23 Ta-
ble 1 reports the results. This table should be compared with Table 2,
which shows the distribution of income among occupants of stabilized
apartments. This evidence supports the view that the median income of
owners exceeds that of their tenants but also shows that there is consider-
20. Steven K. Mayo, Theory and Estimation in the Economics of Housing Demand, 10 J. URB.
ECON. 95 (1981).
21. C. LANCE BARNETT, USING HEDONIC INDICES To MEASURE HOUSING QUALITY (1979);
JAMES R. FOLLAIN & STEPHEN MALPEZZI, DISSECTING HOUSING VALUE AND RENT: ESTIMATES
OF HEDONIC INDICES FOR THIRTY-NINE LARGE SMA's (1980); SALLY R. MERRILL, HEDONIC
INDICES AS A MEASURE OF HOUSING QUALITY (1980); CHARLES W. NOLAND, ASSESSING HE-
DONIC INDICES FOR HOUSING (1980); Allen C. Goodman & Mashiro Kawai, Length-of-Residence
Discounts and Rental Housing Demand: Theory and Evidence, 61 LAND ECON. 93 (1985).
22. See, e.g., RICHARD F. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969).
23. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., THE OWNERS OF NEW YORK'S RENTAL HOUSING: A PROFILE
(1981).
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able overlap between the two distributions. There are many low-income
owners and many high-income occupants of rent stabilized housing.
Does a difference in average income between two groups justify in-
come transfers from all members of one group to all members of the
other? The mean income of Jews in the United States exceeds that of
others. Does this justify taxing Jews to provide subsidies to others?
Should we tax Chinese-Americans to subsidize others for this reason?
Should the food stamp program be financed by a tax on farmers? Few
would answer these questions positively because it is not considered ap-
propriate to finance government programs by a tax based on characteris-
tics such as religion, ethnicity, or occupation. Instead, the majority favor
taxes that impose the same burden on equally wealthy people. The pri-
mary programs for helping low-income households in the United States
are financed by broad-based taxes.
It is often said that local governments cannot afford to provide help
to the needy through explicit subsidies such as housing allowances, but
that they can provide benefits to some needy people via rent control. 24
This argument is difficult to understand. In order to provide benefits,
rent control must impose costs on some people. These people are pri-
marily those who own rental housing before rent control goes into effect.
If these people can be implicitly taxed via rent control, it is not at all
clear why they cannot be explicitly taxed to the same extent. Specifically,
the tax would be a proportional tax on the assessed value of rental prop-
erty owned at a date immediately prior to any public discussion of the
tax. Landlords would thus have no incentive to work harder to oppose
the explicit rather than the implicit tax.
Even if one could produce a satisfactory justification for transfers
from owners of rental housing to their tenants, one would be hard
pressed to justify the pattern of costs and benefits of existing rent control
ordinances and the nature of the subsidies and implicit taxes.
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS OF RENT CONTROL
In discussing the distribution of benefits, it is important to distin-
guish between the distribution among tenants living in the units when
controls are adopted and those who move into these units later. The
distribution of benefits among the first group is fairly clear without any
study. The typical rent control ordinance rolls rents back to levels that
prevailed at a date prior to serious consideration of the ordinance. This
24. Keating, supra note 7, at 1225.
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would normally be about a year before its enactment. The percentage
reduction in rents will be approximately the same at all rent levels and so
the absolute reduction in rent will be greater at higher rent levels. The
benefit to each tenant will be roughly equal to the absolute reduction in
rent. Since average expenditure on housing is larger for richer house-
holds, average benefits are larger for these households. Since the major-
ity of renters are middle and upper income by any reasonable definition,
they surely receive the bulk of the benefits in the years immediately after
the imposition of controls. Over time, the distribution of benefits de-
pends upon how long these households stay in their controlled units.25
However, the small differences in mobility rates across income classes
could not possibly change the preceding conclusions. 26
As mentioned earlier, it is not clear whether tenants who move into
controlled units after the adoption of rent control actually benefit, be-
cause they pay key money and incur extra search costs in order to obtain
possession of the unit and may spend more on its maintenance than they
would in an uncontrolled unit. It is clear that all studies of rent control
in the United States have overestimated benefits by ignoring these costs.
For what they are worth, studies of rent control ordinances that
have been in existence for a while are unanimous in concluding that the
variance in annual benefits is quite large among households with the
same characteristics. 27 For example, Ault and Saba estimate that the
mean benefit of rent control to occupants of controlled units in New
York City in 1968 was $233 but that the standard deviation of benefits
among households with the same income and size and the same race and
age of the head was $737.28 When consideration is expanded to all occu-
pants of rental housing (that was not publicly subsidized) and a benefit of
zero is assigned to households living in the uncontrolled sector, they esti-
mate that the mean benefit was $151 and that the standard deviation of
benefits among households that were the same with respect to the afore-
mentioned characteristics was $537.29 Findings such as these have led all
investigators to conclude that equals are not treated at all equally under
mature rent control ordinances.
25. If households who move into controlled units after the enactment of rent control receive
benefits or if households who live in uncontrolled housing incur losses, we would also have to take
into account how many years households spend in each sector to determine the distribution of bene-
fits over time.
26. Hamilton et al., supra note 4, at Exhibits 2-14.
27. See, e.g., Ault & Saba, supra note 17; Peter Linneman, The Effects of Rent Control on the
Distribution of Income Among New York City Renters, 22 J. URa. ECON. 14 (1987); Olsen, supra note
9; Olsen & York, supra note 17.
28. Ault & Saba, supra note 17.
29. Id.
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These studies have produced conflicting results concerning differ-
ences in average benefits among different types of households. For exam-
ple, Ault and Saba estimate that the mean benefit is larger for richer
rather than for poorer households living in controlled units, although
they are the same with respect to other characteristics. 30 Ault and Saba
also estimate that non-whites receive smaller benefits than similarly situ-
ated whites. 3' However, using identical data, Olsen obtains opposite
results. 32
In short, the distribution of benefits of rent control among renters in
the jurisdiction at the time that controls are imposed is perverse under
the usual arguments for income redistribution, and the distribution
among those who come later is haphazard.
3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSTS OF RENT CONTROL
While there is no evidence on the distribution of the cost of rent
control, the following propositions are almost certainly true. The major-
ity of families at each wealth level do not own rental housing. The cost
of rent control is borne overwhelmingly by people who own rental hous-
ing at the time that it is adopted. Equally wealthy owners of rental prop-
erty do not bear the same cost because they hold different proportions of
their assets in this form.
These propositions lead to two questions. Why should rent control,
which allegedly serves a public purpose, be financed by an implicit tax on
such a small proportion of the population, and why should the magni-
tude of this tax on equally wealthy people depend upon the proportion of
their assets held in the form of rental housing?
Even the meager evidence available makes clear that rent control
has no merit as a redistributive device. It is much inferior to programs
such as food stamps, housing vouchers, and AFDC that provide benefits
to the poorest households funded by broad-based taxes. These programs
provide the largest benefits to the poorest households and impose the
largest taxes on the wealthiest taxpayers.
4. THE EFFICIENCY OF RENT CONTROL
The shortcomings of rent control ordinances are not limited to their
unjustifiable patterns of benefits and costs. They are also highly ineffi-
cient redistributive devices. They lead to higher costs of producing hous-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Olsen, supra note 9, at 1095.
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ing services in both the controlled and uncontrolled sectors and to
haphazard changes in consumption patterns by occupants of controlled
units.
A consistent finding of empirical studies of mature rent control ordi-
nances is that their benefits to tenants are much less than their costs to
landlords.33 For example, Olsen estimates that the total benefit of rent
control in New York City in 1968 to tenants was $270 million while its
cost to landlords was $514 million. 34 Such a difference is not the inevita-
ble consequence of a program of transfers from landlords to tenants. If
an explicit tax had been imposed on landlords in proportion to the mar-
ket value of the rental housing that they owned prior to any discussion of
the tax and if the proceeds had been distributed to tenants in the form of
cash grants, there would have been no differences between these num-
bers. The reason that there is a difference is that some occupants of con-
trolled units live in more desirable apartments and spend less on other
goods than they would have chosen if they had been given cash grants
with the same costs to their landlords, while others live in less desirable
apartments and spend more on other goods. If other members of society
care about these households but think that they undervalue some goods
(for example, housing) and overvalue other goods, it is good social policy
to induce these households to choose more of the former and less of the
latter than they would choose if given cash grants. However, this is not a
persuasive argument for the changes in consumption patterns brought
about by rent control.
The empirical evidence indicates that the majority of occupants of
controlled units occupy less desirable housing and consume more of
other goods than they would choose if given a cash grant. To justify this
outcome, it would have to be argued that others believe that these house-
holds overvalue housing. The evidence also suggests that a substantial
minority occupy better housing. To justify this outcome, it would have
to be argued that others believe that these households undervalue hous-
ing. While some people may well feel that some overvalue housing and
others undervalue it, there is no reason to believe that rent control
changes consumption patterns in the desired directions for these two
groups.
All published estimates of the benefits of rent control to tenants im-
plicitly assume that each occupant of a controlled unit lives in an apart-
ment with his preferred combination of characteristics such as space,
33. Ault & Saba, supra note 17; Olsen, supra note 9; Olsen & York, supra note 17.
34. Olsen, supra note 9, at 1094.
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amenities, and location among units with the same market rent as the
controlled unit. It has long been suggested that the difficulty of finding a
controlled unit leads many of their occupants to live in units that are not
well-suited to their current circumstances. 35 In a preliminary study of
this issue based on one and two-person households headed by white
males under 40 years old living in Manhattan in 1965, Olsen estimates
that the magnitude of this distortion is large. 36 When he accounts for
preferences for particular attributes of housing, he finds that estimated
benefits are only one-fourth as large as benefits estimated using the stan-
dard approach that assumes that households are living in units with their
preferred combinations of characteristics.
Economists have long argued that rent control will lead to less
maintenance of the controlled stock. For an ordinance which places a
ceiling on the rent of each apartment that is independent of its condition,
it is usually argued that landlords will not maintain controlled apart-
ments at all because maintenance adds something to cost but nothing to
revenue. A more careful analysis of this type of ordinance reveals that a
profit-maximizing landlord will spend some money on maintenance if
this is needed to prevent the market rent of the apartment from falling
below its controlled rent. 37 Even in this case the landlord will spend less
on maintenance than in the absence of rent control.
The problem with the usual analysis is that it ignores a common
feature of rent control ordinances and a likely response to them. Rent
control laws typically allow higher rents for units that are improved and
impose lower ceilings on units that are allowed to deteriorate.38 It has
been shown that as a theoretical proposition rent control ordinances that
increase the ceiling rent on an apartment generously when it is upgraded
and decrease it severely when it is allowed to deteriorate will lead to
greater landlord maintenance of the unit.39 Furthermore, even ordi-
nances that reduce landlord maintenance to zero can lead to offsetting
maintenance by the tenantA°
Since the effect of rent control on the maintenance of the controlled
stock is ambiguous on theoretical grounds, empirical research is neces-
35. Olsen, supra note 9, at 1096-97.
36. Edgar 0. Olsen, Bias in Estimating the Benefits of Government Programs Due to Misappli-
cation of Composite Commodity Theorems: Estimates for Major U.S. Housing Programs (August
1990) (Unpublished Discussion Paper 927-90, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of
Wisconsin).
37. Edgar 0. Olsen, "hat do Economists Know About the Effect of Rent Control on Housing
Maintenance?, I J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 295, 296-98 (1988).
38. Baar, supra note 3, at 781-826, 830-32.
39. Olsen, supra note 37, at 298-300.
40. Id. at 300-02.
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sary to determine the direction as well as the magnitude of this effect.
Unfortunately, the sparse empirical literature contains no compelling evi-
dence. 4' However, it is important to realize that rent control leads to
inefficient production of housing services whether it increases or de-
creases the flow of services from controlled units. In the uncontrolled
sector, landlords will maintain units to the point where the last dollar
spent on maintenance will increase the value of the housing stock by a
dollar. If rent control leads to less maintenance of a controlled unit, the
last dollar spent on maintenance will increase the value of the housing
stock by more than a dollar. If it leads to more maintenance, the last
dollar spent on maintenance will increase the value of the housing stock
by less than a dollar. Efficient production of housing stock requires that
the last dollar spent on the maintenance of each dwelling increase the
value of the stock by the same amount. If this condition is violated, it is
possible to have a housing stock of the same value for a lower total cost.
Furthermore, rent control leads to inefficient production of housing serv-
ices to the extent that tenant maintenance replaces landlord maintenance
and tenants are less efficient providers of this maintenance than their
landlords.
Rent control creates incentives for owners of controlled units to
move these units into the owner-occupied sector. Furthermore, although
rent control ordinances typically exempt from controls housing built af-
ter their adoption, it seems plausible that owners of uncontrolled units in
a locality with rent control will require a higher risk premium than they
would in the absence of the ordinance. Therefore, it is reasonable to ex-
pect the price of housing service in the uncontrolled sector to be higher
than it would have been in the absence of rent control. For both of these
reasons, it is to be expected that rent control will lead more households
to be homeowners. The meager evidence available supports this view. 42
Contrary to the views of many social commentators, there is no
41. For a critical analysis of two of the three best empirical studies of this issue, see id. at 295.
In a more recent study, Gyourko and Linneman attempt to estimate the effect of rent control and the
magnitude of the rent control subsidy on the number of units that are in sound condition, accounting
for the influence of a few other variables, namely the borough in which the unit is located, the year
that the building was built, and whether the unit is in a structure with more than six floors. Joseph
Gyourko & Peter Linneman, Rent Controls and Rental Housing Quality. A Note on the Effects of
New York City's Old Controls, 27 J. URB. ECON. 398 (1990). The primary shortcoming of the study
is that uncontrolled units are likely to differ substantially from controlled units with respect to unob-
served characteristics. As a result, the error term in their statistical relationship is correlated with
the rent control variables and their estimators are biased. For example, about two-thirds of the units
decontrolled between 1947 and 1965 were in one and two family houses. RENT CONTROL: MYTHS
& REALITIES 118 (Walter Block & Edgar 0. Olsen eds., 1981).
42. Gyourko & Linneman, supra note 17 at 66-73; Lawrence B. Smith, An Economic Assess-
ment of Rent Controls: The Ontario Experience, 1 J. REAL. EST. FIN. & ECON. 217, Table 2 (1988).
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good reason to believe that it is desirable for more households to be
homeowners. A homeowner must sell his house every time he moves.
This involves real cost. So it makes sense for people who expect to move
frequently to be renters. Furthermore, home ownership typically in-
volves holding a large proportion of one's wealth in the form of one asset,
thus exposing these households to more risk. To justify government ac-
tion to increase the home ownership rate, it must be shown that people
other than the new homeowners benefit. Some arguments of this sort
have been offered, but none are supported by empirical evidence. Fur-
thermore, we already have massive implicit subsidies through the income
tax system that has induced many households who would otherwise rent
to be homeowners.43 Rent control exacerbates a bad situation with re-
spect to tenure choice.
The other frequently mentioned efficiency effects of rent control are
neither supported nor refuted by empirical evidence. These include the
increase in the risks facing providers of rental housing, the greater search
costs incurred by tenants, and the effect of rent control in one political
jurisdiction in an urban area on the location of new construction in the
area.
5. CONCLUSION
Despite the gaps in our knowledge of the effects of rent control, the
case against this type of government action is fairly strong. No compel-
ling justification has been offered for financing benefits to tenants by an
implicit tax on landlords. There is no satisfactory explanation of why the
magnitude of this tax on equally wealthy people should depend on the
proportion of their assets held in the form of rental housing. The pattern
of benefits is equally indefensible. Among households living in controlled
units when rent control is enacted, the richest households receive the
largest benefits. Among households who move into controlled housing
later, there is no discernible relationship between benefit and household
characteristics and the variance in benefit among similar households is
large. In short, rent control is a poorly focused redistributive device.
It is also highly inefficient. The benefits of a mature rent control
ordinance to tenants is far less than its cost to landlords because it leads
to distortions in the consumption patterns of tenants and the production
decisions of landlords. The majority of tenants occupy a unit whose
overall desirability is less than that of the unit that they would occupy if
43. Harvey S. Rosen, Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency and Equity, in
1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
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given a cash grant by their landlord, while a significant minority occupy
a better unit. Furthermore, many tenants live in units whose particular
characteristics are not well suited to their current circumstances. That
is, rent control leads to haphazard changes in consumption patterns. Fi-
nally, theoretical reasoning suggests that rent control leads to higher
costs of producing housing services in both the controlled and uncon-
trolled sectors. It induces some units to be undermaintained and (per-
haps) others to be overmaintained. It induces too many people to be
homeowners, imposes greater search costs on tenants, increases the risks
facing providers of housing services, and affects the location of new con-
struction in an urban area.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG OWNERS OF RENT
STABILIZED UNITS IN NEW YORK CITY IN 1984
Annual Income Class Percentage of Owners
Under $10,000 9
10,000 - 19,999 21
20,000 - 39,999 24
40,000 - 74,999 33
75,000 or more 13
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., supra note 23, at 3.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG OCCUPANTS OF RENT
STABILIZED UNITS IN NEW YORK CITY IN 1983
Annual Income Class Percentage of Tenants
Under $10,000 36
10,000 - 14,999 15
15,000 - 19,999 13
20,000 - 24,999 10
25,000 - 34,999 12
35,000 or more 14
Source: 1984 New York City Housing and Vacancy
Survey

